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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff-Counterclaim 
Defendant/Appellant, 
v. 
BILL HART d/b/a HART 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant-Counterclaimant/ * 
Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel Sill's appeal from a final judgment 
entered by the district court after a jury trial on the parties' competing breach-of-
contract/unjust enrichment claims and defendant-counterclaimant Bill Hart dba Hart 
Construction's mechanic's lien foreclosure action. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in not dismissing 
Bill Hart's mechanic's lien foreclosure action based on his failure to comply with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill, 
and in awarding Hart prejudgment interest and attorney fees in that action. 
* Case No. 20050245-CA 
Sill preserved that issue for review in his post-verdict memorandum responses to 
Hart's motion for entry of judgment, decree of foreclosure, and award of prejudgment 
interest, attorney fees and costs (R. 1369-79, 1411-20). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001)1: 
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of 
the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable 
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
1
 The version of § 38-1-11, as set forth here, was the version in effect in 2002 when 
Hart served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. In 2004, the legislature amended that 
section. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11 (Supp. 2004). None of the amendments, 
however, is relevant to the issue before this Court, which must only construe the 
version of Subsection (4) of 38-1-11 that was in place in 2002 (Subsection (4) was 
enacted in 2001, effective April 30, 2001). Accordingly, all citations to § 38-1-11(4) 
that appear in this brief are to that version. 
9 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
The parties entered into an agreement by which Hart, a general contractor, was 
to build a home for Sill in The Colony subdivision in White Pine Canyon ("the 
Project"), and Sill was to pay him for that. The Project was to consist of a main house, 
an apartment attached to the main house, a garage, and a guesthouse. Hart also was to 
build a barn for Sill. Hart began construction in June 1999 and continued until 
approximately November 2001, when he left the job based on a disagreement with Sill 
concerning completion of the Project. At that point, Sill had paid Hart $2,598,871. 
Thereafter, Sill paid others to complete the Project. (R. 1-33, 1050-52). 
Sill sued Hart, and Hart counterclaimed. The principal claims advanced by the 
parties were based in contract, with Sill seeking to recover damages he contended 
resulted from Hart's failure to complete the Project as agreed upon by the parties, and 
Hart counterclaiming for money he alleged Sill still owed him under their agreement. 
Hart also sued to foreclose on the mechanic's lien he had filed against Sill's property. 
(R. 1-33, 59-81). 
The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Hart of 
$314,500.00 on his unjust enrichment and mechanic's lien claims. Hart sought to 
reduce the verdict to judgment. Sill opposed that effort in one major respect, arguing 
that Hart's mechanic's lien action was barred (the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it) 
because Hart had failed to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) when 
he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. Sill argued that Hart therefore was not 
entitled to foreclosure on his mechanic's lien or awards of prejudgment interest and 
attorney fees, the only basis for awards being the favorable verdict for Hart on his lien 
foreclosure action. (R. 1244-88, 1369-79, 1411-20).2 
The trial court rejected Sill's arguments and entered judgment on the jury's 
verdict in Hart's favor, including the lien foreclosure action. (Judgment, Addendum 
1). The court awarded Hart prejudgment interest and attorney fees under the statutory 
provision that permits an award of fees to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action (UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2001)). In rejecting Sill's challenge 
to the lien action, the court said: 
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced [in 
§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a)] on Sill. He also readily admits that he is not entitled to 
recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust 
enrichment claim. But he vigorously disputes the notion that Subsection 
(4) applies to this dispute. 
Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially 
dispositive of this issue and, therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain 
and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule in their favor. 
According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an 
action to enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in 
Subsection (4). Not so, according to Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he 
asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" and serves a "complaint" 
(versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct. 
2
 The parties had reserved for post-verdict determination any issues concerning Hart's 
compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's 
lien. Stipulation on Mechanic's Lien Issues (R. 1050-52). 
d 
Memorandum Decision (hereafter "Decision," copy contained in Addendum 2) at 2-3 
(R. 1463-64). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
It is undisputed that when Hart served his counterclaim complaint3 (setting forth 
the mechanic's lien foreclosure action) on Sill in 2002, Hart did not include with the 
service of the counterclaim the instructions and forms described in UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). Decision at 2. That is the principal fact relevant to the issue 
presented for review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), a provision within Utah's 
mechanic's lien statutes, a lien claimant who files an action against a homeowner to 
enforce a mechanic's lien must serve on the owner certain instructions and forms with 
the complaint that initiates the action. If the lien claimant fails to do that, the claimant 
is barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e). In short, Subsection 
3
 The term "counterclaim complaint" is used throughout this brief to refer to Hart's 
pleading containing his mechanic's lien foreclosure claim (just as that term was used 
below in Sill's briefing to the trial court). The courts routinely use "counterclaim 
complaint" in this fashion. See, e.g., Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 
F.3d 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 2001) ("Colkitt reasserted those counterclaims not dismissed 
with prejudice in an amended counterclaim complaint"); Foundation for Interior Design 
Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001) 
("College alleged in its counterclaim complaint * * *"); Federal Kemper Life Assur. 
Co. v. Ellis, 28 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Defendant then filed a motion for 
leave to file an answer and amended counterclaim complaint"). The Utah Supreme 
Court used the term in a recent decision. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 1, 67 P.3d 
1000 ("she has filed a motion to intervene and an amended counterclaim complaint"). 
c 
(4)(a) of 38-1-11 is a jurisdictional provision, and a lien claimant's failure to comply 
with its requirements deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear the claimant's lien 
foreclosure action. 
In the instant case, Hart, a lien claimant who brought an action to foreclose on 
the mechanic's lien he had filed against property owned by Sill, did not include the 
instructions and forms identified in Subsection (4)(a) with the counterclaim complaint 
(setting forth the lien foreclosure action) he served on Sill. Under the plain language of 
Subsection (4)(a), Hart was required to do that. The trial court therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien action and should have dismissed it. The court, 
however, erroneously construed Subsection (4)(a) to not apply to Hart's counterclaim 
complaint and improperly entered judgment in Hart's favor on the lien action. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the judgment in favor of Hart on the lien 
action and the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney fees to Hart, the only basis 
for those awards being the erroneous judgment on the lien action. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not dismissing - for lack of jurisdiction - Hart's 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action based on his failure to comply with UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001) when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. 
A. Standard of Review 
The trial court's determination that it had jurisdiction to consider Hart's 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action presents a question of law; therefore, this Court 
reviews that decision for correctness, owing the trial court no deference. State v. Lara, 
, JMM in"! App 318, 1 10. 79P.3d 951 ("Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction 
I11 I ifiKj'slti HI nil 11 ' milli;,11 wt: renew Im correctness,1"'! I'urther, the trial court's 
interpretation of a slalute piesrnls i qiirstnHI JI Ul\ it,v\r\\{*i) '"• .npnl iu 'v , i1""'<l"" """ 
i Suit t tike County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
B. Under the plain language of 1JTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001), 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hart's mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action; therefore, that action should have been dismissed and 
Har t ' s request for awards of prejudgment interest and attorney fees denied. 
The issue on appeal is straightforwnnl Did (lie nil il r MIII rir in nuiclinliiig llui 
with respect to Hart's mechanic's lien foreclosure action, he was not required to 
comply with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1 * " * Va) (2001) v 1-n he served his counterclaim 
complain! < II Sill I'lic resolution ol that issue is critical (o dclwiiiiiiinj?, whether Hart is 
entitled lo nvovn pivjiidpnnil n i lnnl mil .ilMni,^, (ITS llieir IKIIIJ: IIM -ilispuli1 1L1I 
Hart's entitlement to both rests on his having M valid lien foreclosure .i. i In "JIN u t, ' 
if the trial court incorrectly construed § 38 1 1 l(4)(a) as inapplicable u. Hart's 
counterclaim complaint, he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or 
attorney fh^. 
1. The statutory scheme 
To fully underlain! ihe issue presented lor re\ievv, one must first examine the 
statutory scheme tin. eg i Mature has adopted w:th respect to providing homeowners 
iiulur il 11 it*i . i......
 f*LAs agaiii.^; niur propertv •• )h. .<—u-
intending t 
i 
relationship between a contractor and a homeowner, the legislature enacted the 
following provision requiring an original contractor to include such notice in the written 
contract with the owner: 
Beginning July 1, 1995, the original contractor or real estate 
developer shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions 
are necessary for the owner to be protected under Section 38-11-107 from 
the maintaining of a mechanic's lien or other civil action against the 
owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for 
qualified services. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-108(1) (2001). 
The legislature's intent to require a contractor to give notice of the statutes 
providing a homeowner protection from mechanic's liens is further reflected in the lien 
notice provision, which again requires a contractor, who is filing a mechanic's lien, to 
inform the homeowner of those statutes: 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement 
setting forth: 
# * * 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined 
in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the 
lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(h) (2001).4 
4
 The version of § 38-1-7 in effect at the time Hart filed his lien notice is set forth 
here. That section was amended in 2004, and Subsection (2)(h) was renumbered 
(2)(a)(ix). The content of the subsection was not changed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-
1-7 (Supp. 2004). 
R 
Finally, the legislature adopted the strictest, notice requirement for a lien claimant 
in ii pit vision addressing (lie lini daiiiuiif :\ IIIMIJJ, ol ,m JIUOII against a homeowner to 
enforce a mechanic's lien: 
(V I r :ir claimant files an action n> enforce a lien filed nnder this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38 i ; 102 die hen 
claimant shall include ^ ith Hie MM-\ it c of the complaint on »he o\\ PAT *.>f 
the r-^iden- • 
(ij iiihi.ci^inhi^ it- ...i t»wiKi t»> me ICMUCI.''. me owner's 
rights under Title 38, C-iapi'"* 1 ' P.-^I'MH.,* ? ;.,.*
 : r j * :,.,« 
Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable 
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon winch the owner 
' may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapiei . uienee Lien 
• Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
* * * 
i.e.* 11 a lien ouinant fails to proMu-. ;::* jwna o. :,,*, ic^\ai\u 
instructions and lurai alTidau-: required b\ Subsection 4<a>. the hen 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
in Ml m m ANN «",' 'WS il i i(-nia) & (e) (2o01^ Subsection (4)(a) requires the lien 
claimanl win* ait S I nlon \ lln In i I | n ulr fin: IMUIIUMMIU vi, illi certain 
actions and forms concerning an owner's rights to removal ol Hie lini under Hie 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (hereafter "Residence Lien 
.^r-MA/iion t4^e) makes clear that a lien claimant's failure to provide a 
i iorm affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a)" 
bars enioice:in • :.^ il kn l.n'iiloi. enienl \u imisdietional, 
Q 
based on a failure to satisfy a statutory precondition to suit. See Beaver County v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (whether a statutory procedural 
requirement is jurisdictional depends on whether it is "mandatory" (jurisdictional) or 
merely "directory" (not jurisdictional)); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 
(Utah 1988) (Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirement for filing suit against a 
governmental entity is a precondition to suit; failure to satisfy a precondition to suit 
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction). 
As previously noted, in the trial court Sill argued that, under Subsection (4)(e), 
Hart's failure to include with the service of his counterclaim complaint the instructions 
and affidavit referenced in Subsection (4)(a) required dismissal of his lien foreclosure 
action and denial of his requests for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. 
Specifically, Sill argued that the commonly accepted definitions of the terms "action" 
and "complaint," as used in Subsection (4)(a), include a counterclaim, and thus Hart 
was required to comply with Subsection (4)(a)'s notice requirements when he served his 
counterclaim complaint on Sill. The trial court disagreed. 
2. The plain meaning of the terms "action" and "complaint," and the 
purpose of Subsection (4) (a) 
The trial court rejected Sill's argument concerning Subsection (4)(a) on the 
ground that the term "complaint," as used in that provision, is not reasonably 
interpreted to include a counterclaim. It reasoned: 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that 
the Utah Legislature limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a 
10 
homeowner with the materials referenced in Subsection (4)(a) to those 
instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through 
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 
'action' without more is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of 
judicial proceeding, including counterclaims" (Local Union No. 38, Sheet 
Metal Workers' Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the 
reference to "service of the complaint." Second, this reference to a 
complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement of a lawsuit 
and that is commonly under stood to be distinct from a. counterclaim.. See, 
e.g., Local Union No, 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l i \ Pelella, 350 F.3d 
at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ? < "A civil action is 
commenced (1) by filing of a complaint . . . , or (2) by service of a 
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishi^. 
complaint from other pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended 
- ""s construction, it could have easily provided for it (e.g., by 
•Ntituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection 
< 4Xa)). 
Decision at 3 (footnotes omit(ctl) 
Relying lieu fi", on "I'lit* ,S"n»nil > . * 
Sheet Metal Workers Int7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (T l ''>• ' ided 
that a narrow construction of the term "complaint" (not to include a counterclaim) is in 
harmony with the mechanic's lien statutes "general purpose * * * 'to provide protection 
! lliust Jiu Liiliaiin iilin \ ilin I i pinpi in) I supplying labor or mate* .w « " 
Decision at 4 ('qui >t i m\ - AAA Fencing Compt my i Rainti ee De i }elopment i ini / Energy 
Company, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986)). The court believed "Sill's construction [of 
'complaint'] is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose." /< 1, at 5 1:1 9. Citing 
ii'li'ii majont) opinion 111 /V/«'//i/, itic court also loimd, as additional support for its 
mmm iiiicrprdafiii nt '< IHMJJI.MIH ,' ih;H "llu1 ronmih Ihil Subsection (4) guard 
1 1 
against are lessened when the homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with 
the legal process by instituting suit against a lien claimant." Id. at 4 n.5. 
The problems with the trial court's analysis begin with its notion that the 
requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are somehow tempered by the mechanic's lien 
statutes' "overarching purpose" to protect those who have enhanced the value of a 
property by supplying materials or labor. While that purpose is clear, it does not 
permit a court or a lien claimant to ignore prominent procedural requirements within 
the statutory scheme that plainly are intended to provide protection for the homeowner 
as opposed to the lien claimant. See First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 
486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Of course, 'compliance with the [mechanics' lien] statute 
is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created by the statute.'" (quoting 
AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289, 
291 (Utah 1986)). Those requirements are noted above, and Subsection (4)(a) 
undeniably falls into the category of provisions intended to protect the homeowner from 
an improper mechanic's lien through a requirement that the lien claimant inform the 
owner of rights under the Residence Lien Act when a lien enforcement action is 
initiated. The clear purpose of (4)(a) is to ensure that when a lien claimant sues a 
homeowner to enforce a lien, the owner is fully informed of those rights. 
The trial court narrowly interpreted the term "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) to 
mean only an initial complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff, and not to include 
a lien claimant's counterclaim complaint filed in response to an owner's suit against the 
10 
lien claimant. To accept the court's narrow interpretation of "complaint," one must 
• • - - • - : *lv unreasonable, conclusion: The 
legislature, concerned about protecting ;i homcoww i "M IIJ .his, iiifnidal l'» ICIJUIM ::i lini 
claimant to inform the homeowner of rights under the Residence Lien Act at I lit" 
contracting stage (§ 38-1 M08HV> r -V notice-of-lien Mage (§ *8-l 7(2)(h)), and 
iiiwll) , I (In* iHigal'irii ..a... s .
 sd)) when UR i*en claimant sues the 
homeowner - bu« • - • iction as an 
original plaintiff rather than as a counterclaimant. I hat construe:(ion, w Im d as 
explained below is not in harmony with the commonly accepted meaning of the terms 
" in iMiii iiiiii i iiiiiii|ilniiii and the context in which they are UM^ '*-. Subsection (4)(a), 
defen? to ensure that a homeowner is 
informed of the Residence Lien Act rights af (lie (inn „i hi in uliiiin.iiii MM--,, in I-HIUM V a 
mechanic's lien. It is illogical to conclude that the legislature, with that protective 
purpose in mind, intended to draw a distinction between ;> Men enforcement action 
IHOIIL'III in iin ongini.iI n IIIII[il.imiirii ililai In ihe lien claimant as a plaintiff and the very 
same action brought by the lien n t u n y in IIIIII ,I < mmcii in IIIIII I in n< i mi1, IIIIII picciseiy 
the same position in each scenario: the defendant in an action broughi In ' Mir lie, 
claimant to enforce a mechanic's lien. 
construing a statute h fo give effect- tr l ie legislature's intent 
in light c > HUu.jtdUi 
SchoolDist. r.bdndyCui '>"-.' "^'•1 ead 
1 1 
the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 
UT 12, 1 17, 66 P.3d 592. Additionally, "[i]t is axiomatic that a statute should be 
given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an 
absurd and unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 
760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988). To construe Subsection (4)(a) as the trial court did 
here defeats the obvious legislative intent to provide certain informational protection to 
a homeowner who is sued by a lien claimant to enforce the lien, and thus the court 
violated the foregoing principles of statutory construction. 
The court's contention that the concerns Subsection (4)(a) guards against are 
lessened when a homeowner sues the lien claimant first and the lien enforcement action 
is brought as a counterclaim is unpersuasive. Without explanation, the court concluded 
that a plaintiff homeowner "has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal 
process by instituting suit against a lien claimant," and thus may be presumed not to 
require the information referenced in Subsection (4)(a). Decision at 4 n.5. Why that 
would be so is not at all clear. For example, the mere fact that a homeowner brings a 
breach-of-contract action against a contractor, as Sill did here, provides no basis for 
concluding that such an owner therefore has a better understanding of a homeowner's 
rights under the Residence Lien Act than would an owner who is sued as a defendant in 
an action filed first by a lien claimant as a plaintiff to enforce a mechanic's lien. 
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Iin llieniiOR „ Hit' (i iiii com ( s construction of Subsection (4)(a) is contrarj to the 
( ml) jurplnl in en n it \y ol (lie kv\ In (us 111  iliai pimmon 'action iiud 
"complaint." First, in American Rural Cell^" -. y 
Corp., 939 P.2d 185 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court interpreted the phrase 
"auion Drought to enforce any lien under fhix chapler" ii TTTAH * ODE ANN, § 38 1 
1 L.KMC j<.j mechanics' lien * * * 
clearly q;i lalifies as ''an action brought t nl< 1 n; 
statute." Four years after American Rural Cellular was issued, the legislature enacted 
Subsection (4)(a) of § 38-1 -11. using the phrase "action to enforce a lien filed under 
, • > neans Riciit.^ai u> me phrase in § 33-1-18(1) the Court 
construed in -lw<7/i tin H\u \! t )i!!ntiit When 1 onslnung a statute, a court assumes that 
when the legislature enacted the statute, it was awaiT of pi in n 1 01111 MIVISM HIS COIP.II IJIII^ 
similar statutory language. Donahue v, Warner Bros. Picture Distributing Con ^ 
Utah 2a H K J O * . . - 5S0 (1954), It must be assumed, therefore, w J the 
*••* klu enforce a lien filed under this chapf~~" 
was intended to have the same meaning ;i s 111 1111111 ir s 1 j 111111111 • \ 11»111} ?, 1 j a g u 1 n 11 s 11111 • 11 111 
American Rural Cellular i\e,, llie words "an action" include a counterclaim, like that 
filed by Hart in the instant case. 
ection38~! !H ) states: " r " ,tn> actioi•" i^^  :«> enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shali ne entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to 
be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
1 * 
Second, the term "complaint," which appears after the phrase "an action to 
enforce a lien filed under this chapter" in Subsection (4)(a), must be interpreted with 
reference to that preceding phrase. As this Court has said, "courts typically construe 
statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used advisedly and that the intent of the 
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is 
placed:" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ward v. 
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added by this Court)). It is 
with that principle in mind that the meaning of the term "complaint," as used in 
Subsection (4)(a), must be determined. 
Again, Subsection (4)(a) reads: 
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include [certain instructions and forms] with the service of 
the complaint on the owner of the residence^] 
Central to that provision is the filing of an "action" by a lien claimant to enforce a lien, 
and thus the term "complaint" must be read in that context. "Complaint" plainly refers 
to the vehicle by which the lien claimant files the "action," which, as previously noted, 
this Court has held includes a counterclaim. 
Because "complaint" is not defined in Subsection (4)(a), this Court "look[s] to 
its commonly understood meaning." State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). The commonly accepted meaning of "complaint," when used as a legal 
term, is found in Black's Law Dictionary 303 (8th ed. 2004): "The initial pleading that 
starts a civil action and states the basis foi the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the 
pLtiiititlN % Lull!, .mi I llini ill i iiti I I In I „,""i! f nisi* Bin k1«. I ii\s Diclumar) 2i>$ tV1" 
ed. 1979) (defining "complaint" as "[t]he origin; 
is commenced uiuk * * *;• *. • R u l o o( Civil Procedure"); State v. Tolano, 2001 UT 
App 3 / , ; , : ' , . .« v—r* Hoks to Black's I ,aw Dictionary to determine 
c 
Here, Hart commenced his mechar . m IniivliMirr :\i lum by the tiling i»l a 
counterclaim complaint (set forth in his answer). That was the initial pleading that 
started his lien action. Thus, the counterclaini was "the complaint," as that term is 
c ;r ..y understood, by winch Hart "file|d| ail action to enforce a lien," § 38-1-
1 \ CJi ^ ' i . . . -
principle in vtaL Lm ; ! counterclaim u> viewed as . 
defendant against tin >•..; iitiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." 
Harmon \\ Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 6<^ 696 '1Q.nV Sec also Wright & 
Mil1- Inderal Piai In i .mini I'IIII (iliin ;, I IM at 14 ^ ( UI ed. J(KM| ("Since a 
counterclaim basically is a defendant l\ umipfium n pciTivlh Inun.il i II|IJ.H i 
plaintiff <<• respond b. ,; " ^emphasis added)); Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 
(A.D -r^ r" \ counterclaim is in essence a complaint by a defendant against the 
.. ~, , . . . *...-le cause oi <& tin" vron which the defendant seeks 
judgmen ., • . : . . , : ,
 f .. . . .u,, in a responsive 
p a p e r - to wit, the answer. It 15 not a deft n : . * * - i 
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plaintiff in his own right." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
Moreover, that interpretation advances the clear legislative purpose of Subsection (4)(a) 
to ensure that a homeowner is informed of rights under the Residence Lien Act when a 
lien claimant sues the owner to enforce a mechanic's lien. 
The trial court's heavy reliance on Pelella, a split-panel decision from the 
Second Circuit, to arrive at the opposite conclusion is misplaced. The court first cited 
Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82, for the proposition that a complaint is distinct from a 
counterclaim. While the Pelella majority does draw that distinction in construing the 
statutory phrase "to institute an action" as not including a counterclaim, its analysis is 
not helpful in construing Subsection (4)(a) in this case. In American Rural Cellular, 
this Court construed the term "action" as used in the mechanic's lien statutes to include 
a counterclaim. That, not Pelella, is the controlling authority, along with Harmon v. 
Yeager, where the Utah Supreme Court stated, without qualification, that "[a] 
counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the defendant against the 
plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." That view runs 
counter to the Pelella majority's conclusion that "a defendant does not 'institute' an 
action when he asserts a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 82 (cited with approval by the 
trial court, Decision at 4).6 
6
 In a well-reasoned opinion, the dissenting judge in Pelella concluded that "the right 
'to institute an action' includes the right to assert a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 92 
(Straub, J., dissenting). 
18 
The trial court attempted to distinguish the statutory language interpreted in 
American Rural Cellular from that used in Subsection (4)(a), noting that "there are no 
words or phrases in [§ 38-1-18] that restrict the word 'action' in any way" and that 
§ 38-1-18 "references 'any action.'" Decision at 3 n.3. The flaw there is that in 
American Rural Cellular this Court did not give any significance to the modifier "any" 
in front of the word "action." Indeed, the Court specifically said that a counterclaim to 
foreclose a lien "clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce any lien' under the 
mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193 (emphasis added). The words "an action" 
are precisely the words used in Subsection (4)(a), and they operate to compel a broad 
interpretation of the word "complaint," which follows the phrase "an action to enforce 
a lien," and must be construed in light of the meaning of that phrase. Given the 
structure of the sentence in which "complaint" is used, it simply is not reasonable to 
conclude, as the trial court did, that the word "complaint" serves to restrict the term 
"action," such that "action" does not include the counterclaim this Court said it did in 
American Rural Cellular. See, e.g., Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga. 
App. 1999) (noting that the term "complaint" equates with the term "counterclaim" for 
purposes of the statute in issue); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 533 F.Supp. 1122, 
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The City's argument that section 203(c) does not apply 
because the statute uses the term "complaint," whereas in the instant case Brink's is 
attempting to assert the recoupment against a "counterclaim" is without merit; indeed, 
it borders on the frivolous."). 
10 
Finally, the trial court erroneously factored into its analysis that Sill ultimately 
was not eligible for any relief under the Residence Lien Act. The court viewed Sill's 
proposed construction of Subsection (4)(a) as "an interpretation that would restrict 
Hart's ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide 
notice of an irrelevant statutory provision." Decision at 5 n.6. That view, however, 
simply reflects the court's disagreement with a legislative policy decision (i.e., to 
require a lien claimant to give the Subsection (4)(a) notice to a homeowner who is sued 
by the lien claimant to enforce a mechanic's lien, whether or not the owner ultimately is 
eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Act). Such disagreement has no place in 
the process of statutory interpretation. See Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, 
f 23, 61 P.3d 989 ("Indeed, this court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it is 
either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature to 
determine. We need not agree with the legislature as a matter of public policy. . . . 
What the legislature 'should' do is not the question. Rather it is what the legislature 
has done." (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
At bottom, whether or not a homeowner is in a position to exercise rights under 
the Residence Lien Act is irrelevant to this Court's determination of what legislative 
intent the unambiguous language of Subsection (4)(a) reflects. Obviously, the 
legislature did not want the lien claimant deciding whether the homeowner in a given 
case is eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Act; it wanted to ensure that the 
sued owner would be the one making that determination, informed by the instructions 
and forms served in compliance with Subsection (4)(a). Imparting notice of rights to 
the target owner is the clear purpose of (4)(a), and this Court must construe it 
accordingly. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 1 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("[0]ur primary goal 
in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."). 
In sum, considering the plain meaning of the key terms in Subsection (4)(a) and 
the structure of that provision, along with the clear legislative purpose to protect the 
homeowner through the required notice of rights, Hart was required to comply with 
Subsection (4)(a)'s notice requirements when he served his counterclaim complaint on 
Sill. Hart's failure to do so barred his mechanic's lien foreclosure action. The trial 
court erred in concluding otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
judgment in favor of Hart on his mechanic's lien foreclosure action, which should be 
dismissed. The Court also should reverse the trial court's awards of prejudgment 
interest and attorney fees to Hart, the only basis for which are the favorable judgment 
on the lien action. Finally, based on those reversals, the Court should remand the case 
to the trial court with directions to award Sill his reasonable attorney fees and costs in 
defending against Hart's invalid lien action at trial and on appeal, which Sill is entitled 
to under § 38-1-18(1). 
01 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because this case presents the first opportunity for a Utah appellate court to 
interpret § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) with respect to a counterclaim filed by a lien claimant, the 
Court should hear oral argument. 
Dated this 2-8 day of June 2005. 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Counterclaim 
Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART CONSTRUCTION, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
KALLIE J. SILL, and DOES I-X, 
Third Party Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER AND 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 020500012 
Judge Deno G. Himonas 
The Jury having rendered its verdict in this action on October 22, 2004, and the court 
having fully considered Defendant, Coimterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff Bill Hart's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and For Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment 
Interest, Attorneys Fees and Costs, three supporting joint affidavits in support of motion for 
award of attorneys fees, Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, and the related motion 
papers, and having fully considered Plaintiffs opposing memoranda, and having heard oral 
argument from Plaintiffs and Defendant's respective counsel on January 31, 2005, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters judgment consistent with the court's 
Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 2005. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND DECLARED 
as follows: 
1. Bill Hart is awarded judgment in his favor and against Joel Sill, whose address is 
28 White Pine Canyon Road, Park City, Utah 84060, in the amount of $314,500, plus 
prejudgment interest of $98,480.88, plus costs of $5,598.92, plus reasonable attorneys fees in the 
amount of $199,225.75, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which are taxed as costs in this 
matter, for a total judgment of $617,805.55. 
2. This judgment shall bear interest from entry hereof at the post-judgment rate 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3). 
3. The Notice of Lien dated January 30, 2002, recorded on January 31, 2002, as 
Entry 00609900, in Book 1432, Page 511-512, of the official records of the Summit County 
Recorder, is a valid and enforceable lien against the property located in Summit County, State of 
125400-1 ? 
Utah, described as follows (the "Property"), and Defendant Bill Hart is entitled to a foreclosure 
of his lien on the Property: 
All of Homestead No. 15, The Colony At White Pine Canyon, Phase 1 
Amended Final Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on 
file and of record in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
Also together with and subject to all rights, benefits, encumbrances 
and obligations set forth in the grant of easements recorded September 
28,1998 as Entry No. 518627 in Book 1186 at Page 128 of the official 
records. 
Parcel#CWPC-15-AM 
4. The Property is hereby foreclosed pursuant to Defendant's lien, and the Property, 
or such amounts as may be sufficient to pay the amounts due under this judgment and decree, 
together with accruing costs and interest, be sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by Utah law for the sale of real property as in 
the case of foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Joel Sill, and Third Party Defendants, including 
Kallie J. Sill, and each of them, and all persons and entities claiming by, through or under them 
or any of them, have no further estate, right, title, lien, or other interest of any kind in, on, or to 
the Property, except a right of redemption as the case may be as provided by law. Provided, 
however, that the Property be foreclosed and sold subject to any unnamed, non-party person or 
entity that holds any mortgage or interest that is prior to the interests of Defendant. Any party to 
this action may bid for the Property at the sale. 
5. That all persons claiming under Plaintiff Joel Sill or Third Party Defendant Kallie 
Sill, whose interests do not appear of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office as of 
325400-1 
Defendant's filing of the lis pendens of this action, are barred and foreclosed of all right, title, 
interest and equity of redemption in the Property. 
6. The Sheriff, upon sale of the Property, shall distribute the proceeds from the sale 
as follows: 
a. to pay the Sheriffs cost of sale, disbursements and commissions; 
b. to pay to Bill Hart or his attorneys the accrued and accruing costs and 
attorneys fees of this action, together with the remaining amounts owing Bill Hart for the 
total judgment as set forth in paragraph 1 above; 
c. any surplus after payment of the amount set forth above be accounted for and 
paid over by the Sheriff to the Clerk of Court pending further order by this Court. 
7. The person or entity purchasing the Property at the sheriffs sale thereof shall 
receive a Certificate of Sale from the sheriff and shall, subject to the rights of redemption, be 
entitled to immediate possession of the Property and the right to receive and collect all rents 
therefrom. 
8. After the time allowed by law for redemption has expired, the Sheriff shall 
execute and deliver a Sheriffs Deed (the "Deed") to the purchaser at the sheriffs sale or the 
person entitled thereto, as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The grantee named 
therein shall thereupon be entitled to and have possession of the Property. 
9. Defendant Bill Hart is hereby awarded a deficiency judgment against Plaintiff 
Joel Sill for any and all deficiencies remaining due after applying the net proceeds derived from 
the foreclosure sale of the Property to the judgment as herein provided. 
10. This judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys 
fees incurred by Defendant Bill Hart in collecting this judgment, by execution or otherwise, as 
shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of ' Jjflfr 
Approved as to form: 
76^L<P. 
Christina I Miller, Esq. 
David B. Thompson, Esq. 
Miller, Vance & Thompson, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Joel Sill 
< s ^ >f^^~ 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN ORIGINAL 
DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
DA;E: Al\ffl\%Kc^afjfc 
TlEPUTY COUNTY CLERK 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Kallie J. Sill 
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ADDENDUM 2 
In the Third Judicial District Court 
Summit County, State of Utah 
JOEL SILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL HART, d/b/a HART 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALLIE J. SILL and DOES IX, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 020500012 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
From October 13-22, 2004, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Bill Hart d/b/a Bill Hart 
Construction ("Hart"), and Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, Joel Sill ("Sill"), tried this matter 
to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in Hart's favor of $314,500.00 
on his unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien claims. 
Hart now seeks to reduce the verdict to a judgment. To this end, Hart has filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Upon a Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of Prejudgment Interest, 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Motion"). Sill opposes the Motion on the grounds that (1) "Hart's 
lien action is barred" because "Hart failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) 
when he served his counterclaim complaint on Sill;"1 (2) Hart is not entitled to prejudgment interest 
and attorney's fees on his unjust enrichment claim; and (3) "Hart is entitled to only a portion of the 
costs he claims." Response to Motion, pp. 3 & 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court is of 
the view that Hart's lien claim is valid and that he is entitled to prejudgment interest and attorney's 
fees as a result. The Court is also of the view that Hart is entitled to a large part of his costs. 
*By stipulation the parties reserved for "post-verdict determination .. . [a]ny issues concerning 
Hart's compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining and enforcing a mechanic's lien." 
Response to Motion for Entry of Judgment Upon Verdict and for Decree of Foreclosure, Award of 
Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Response to Motion"), p. 2 (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Sill concedes that Hart is entitled to a judgment of $314,500.00 "for his unjust enrichment 
claim." Response to Motion, p. 2. He contests, however, Hart's entitlement to a judgment on his 
mechanics' lien claim. The nub of Sill's argument is that when Hart filed his counterclaim, he failed 
to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Section 11(4) of Utah's mechanics' lien statute 
(Title 38, Chapter 1), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(4)(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under 
this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, 
the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on 
the owner of the residence: (i) instructions to the owner of the 
residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and (ii) a 
form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner 
of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner may 
exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the 
motion for summary judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after 
the service of the summons and complaint upon the nonpaying party, 
as defined in Section 3 8-11 -102, and the time for the nonpaying party 
to respond,..., has elapsed. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon 
the residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (2001)(emphasis added).2 Specifically, Sill argues that Hart never 
served him with the instructions and "form affidavit and motion for summary judgment" identified 
in Subsection (4)(a) when he filed his counterclaim. He further argues that this failure dooms Hart's 
request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because Hart is only entitled to the same if he 
prevails on his lien claim. 
Hart readily admits that he did not serve the papers referenced above on Sill. He also readily 
admits that he is not entitled to recover either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees on his unjust 
enrichment claim. See, e.g., Motion, pp. 8 & 10-13. But he vigorously disputes the notion that 
Subsection (4) applies to this dispute. 
2The parties are in agreement that the mechanics' lien statute in place when Hart filed his 
counterclaim (February 2002) governs this dispute. See, e.g., Response to Motion, p. 3 n.l. 
2 
Both parties acknowledge that Subsection (4) is essentially dispositive of this issue and, 
therefore, contend that the Subsection's plain and unambiguous language requires the Court to rule 
in their favor. According to Sill, Hart's filing of his counterclaim constituted "fil[ing] an action to 
enforce a lien" and triggered the notice obligations set forth in Subsection (4). Not so, according to 
Hart; Subsection (4) applies, he asserts, only if a lien claimant "files an action" ajid serves a 
"complaint" (versus a counterclaim) on a homeowner. Hart is correct. 
"[W]hen interpreting a statute," a court "looks first to the statute's plain language to 
determine" legislative intent. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted). 
In doing so, it must "read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related statutes." Id. (citations omitted). And 
where the statute is clear, the court must not "assess the wisdom of the legislation," but must 
"implement the law as it reads unless it results in an absurd outcome." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 
P.2d 577, 586 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
The plain language of Subsection (4) compels the conclusion that the Utah "Legislature 
limited the obligation of a lien claimant to serve a homeowner with the materials referenced in 
Subsection (4)(a) to those instances in which the lien claimant was initiating an action through 
service of a complaint and not a counterclaim. First, while "[t]he word 'action' without more is 
arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims" 
(Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers'Int'I v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted)), read in the context of Subsection (4), it is qualified by the reference to "service of the 
complaint."3 Second, this reference to a complaint is to a pleading that is filed at the commencement 
of a lawsuit and that is commonly understood to be distinct from a counterclaim. See, e.g., Local 
Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d at 82; see also Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3 ("A civil action is commenced (1) by filing of a complaint..., or (2) by service of a 
summons together with a copy of the complaint") & 7(a) (distinguishing a complaint from other 
pleadings). Third, had the Legislature intended Sill's construction, it could have easily provided for 
it (e.g., by substituting the words "initial pleading" for "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a)).4 
3Sill argues that the Utah Court of Appeals disposed of this issue in his favor in American Rural 
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997), when it held that the 
word "action" in Section 38-1-18 of the mechanics' lien statute included a counterclaim. Id., p. 193. 
Sill's reading ignores that there are no words or phrases in Section 18 that restrict the word "action" in 
any way. Indeed, the current statute references "any action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Sill also 
ignores that the American Rural Cellular decision is in harmony with the purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statute, while his suggested interpretation is not. Infra, pp. 4-5; American Rural Cell, 939 P.2d at 193. 
4Sill counters that the reference to a "summons and complaint" in Subsection (4)(b) is proof that 
the Legislature intended the reference to a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) be broadly construed. Sill's 
conclusion just does not follow. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may not move for 
summary judgment until "the expiration of 20 days from commencement of the action." Subsection 4(b) 
simply makes clear that the motion for summary judgment identified in Subsection (4)(a) is not subject to 
the same restraint. 
3 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' 
Intl v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, is instructive. There, the Second Circuit was confronted with the 
question of whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") barred an 
employee's counterclaim because it was financed by an "interested employer." Urfder Section 
101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, an employee could not "institute an action" that was financed by an 
"interested employer." Therefore, the union argued, Pelella could not maintain his employer-backed 
counterclaim. The Second Circuit, relying heavily on a decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, disagreed. In doing so it noted that: 
[A] defendant does not "institute" an action when he asserts a 
counterclaim. Rather, a plaintiff must commence the action by filing 
a complaint that names a defendant. This affords the defendant the 
ability to file a responsive pleading, namely the answer,..., in which 
he can include a claim for relief against the opposing party. 
Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers' Int 7, 350 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit further noted 
that this "narrow construction" better comported with legislative purpose, and that the "concerns" 
that Section 101(a)(4) "seeks to address'"' were lessened because, "[b]y taking the member to court, 
the union itself introduces the outside actor into what once had been an internal grievance and opens 
the door to some measure of interference." Id., pp. 84-85.5 
Sill counters that in Harman v. Yeagar Et Ux.9 134 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action . . . tested by the same 
tests and rules as a complaint." He further counters that Black's Law Dictionary defines "complaint" 
to include a counterclaim.6 While these arguments are not without some persuasive value, they do 
not carry the day. Moreover, accepting these arguments would only create an ambiguity-an 
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of Hart's construction. 
To the extent that a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate for a court to look beyond its 
language and to its legislative history7 and purpose. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, f 7, 99 P.3d 
383 (citation omitted). With respect to the statute at hand, it is well established that its general 
purpose is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor 
or materials." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289, 
5In a similar fashion, the concerns that Subsection (4) guards against are lessened when the 
homeowner has demonstrated a certain familiarity with the legal process by instituting suit against a lien 
claimant. 
6This is a secondary definition. The primary definition, at least according to Black's Law 
Dictionary, is "[t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced." 
^Because neither party addressed the legislative history of Subsection (4), the Court assumes that 
it is either nonexistent or unhelpful. 
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291 (Utah 1986); see also ButterfieldLumbar, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Assoc., 815 P.2d 1330, 
1334 (Utah 1991).8 That purpose is served by construing Subsection (4) narrowly and consistent 
with its plain language, as Hart urges.9 
Finally, the Court rejects Sill's alternative challenge to Hart's entitlement to prejudgment 
interest and awards Hart the same on his mechanics' lien claim. The Court also awards Hart 
attorney's fees (as prayed for and established by affidavit) and costs of suit (as described by the 
Court at the January 31, 2005 hearing). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part. Counsel 
for Hart is to prepare, circulate, and submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this ^ ^ - d a y of February, 2005, in Summit County, State of Utah. 
BY THECOURT: y / ^ ^ / ^ \ 
DENO G. HI1VTOW& 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ g 
8It is important to note that "[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose and intent." Miller, 2003 UT at Tf 17 (emphasis added) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
9Sill admits that he was not eligible for relief under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act. Nevertheless, he urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that would restrict Hart's 
ability to recover for an otherwise valid lien based on Hart's failure to provide notice of an irrelevant 
statutory provision. While this point is certainly not dispositive, it does help emphasize that Sill's 
construction is contrary to the lien law's overarching purpose. 
5 
